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THE CASE OF THE CHECKER-BOARD ORDINANCE: AN
EXPERIMENT IN RACE RELATIONS
By
BORIS I. BITTKER
Jones & Smith v. Town of New Harmony
United States Court of Appeals, Special Circuit.
September 1, 1965.
Before ADAMS, BAKER, CARSON, DANIEL, and EVERETT, Circuit
Judges.
ADAMS, Circuit Judge.
IN 1963, the Town of New Harmony, Illinois, adopted a so-called "checker-
board ordinance," under which every residential building lot within its cor-
porate limits was classified as either "N" or "W" pursuant to a plan per-
mitting "N" property to be acquired and occupied only by Negroes and "W"
property only by white persons. To classify the plot at the extreme north-east
corner of New Harmony's corporate limits, the mayor flipped a coin at a
public ceremony; with this as a base point, all other residential plots were
thereupon designated, alternately, as "N" or "W". Public, commercial, in-
dustrial, recreational, institutional, and other nonresidential properties are not
affected; but the residential areas of New Harmony are so laid out that the
ordinance has produced in classification, and perhaps eventually would pro-
duce in practice, the "checker-board" from which it derived its popular name.
New Harmony has no areas zoned for apartment houses or other multi-
family dwellings, but the ordinance provides that should any be subsequently
permitted, the apartments shall be alternately designated as "N" and "W".
The ordinance accommodates persons who are neither Negro nor white by
providing that, upon settling in New Harmony for the first time, such a
person may acquire or occupy property regardless of designation, but there-
after he may not acquire or occupy property in the other category; and similar
provision is made for parties to mixed marriages. Servants are not subject to
the occupancy rules, but may live with the families for whom they work.
Subterfuges to avoid the ordinance's restrictions, such as the acquisition of
land through dummies and corporations, are forbidden. An administrative
agency is vested with the power to waive any restriction on acquisition or
occupancy in a case of extreme hardship.
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The ordinance makes any lease, contract for the sale of land, or other agree-
ment invalid if its performance would produce a violation of these rules
governing the acquisition and occupancy of land, and the town clerk is forbid-
den to accept for recordation any conveyance or lease that is not accompanied
by proof that the buyer or tenant may lawfully acquire or occupy the land in
question. In addition, the corporation counsel of New Harmony is authorized
to act, by injunction or other appropriate legal proceeding, in the event the
ordinance is violated by any person.
Appellee Jones, a White, contracted to sell an unimproved building lot
designated as "W" to Smith, a Negro, and, on the date set for closing the
transaction, he tendered a deed in the usual form to Smith upon being paid
the agreed price. The town clerk of New Harmony refused to record the deed,
however, for the sole reason that Smith is a Negro; and the corporation counsel
subsequently advised Jones that the town will continue to treat him as the
owner of the property for all purposes. Jones and Smith thereupon sued New
Harmony, in the appropriate federal district court, for a declaratory judge-
ment that the ordinance is unconstitutional under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment because it prevents Jones
from selling, and Smith from buying, the lot in question solely because Smith
is a Negro. The district court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, Jones and
Smith, with a one sentence opinion citing the racial zoning, restrictive
covenant, and school segregation cases, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917), Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; and the town of New Harmony took this
appeal.
The record consists solely of the complaint filed by Jones and Smith, the
defendant town's motion to dismiss, and the district court's order denying
the motion to dismiss and holding the ordinance unconstitutional; but the
parties have stipulated that we may consider, if relevant, these facts:
1. New Harmony is located on the outskirts of the Chicago metropolitan
area. It became an incorporated town in 1962, when a group of public-spirited
persons, Negro and white, purchased a large tract of undeveloped farm land
in the hope of creating a model "integrated" community and arranged to
meet the state's requirements for municipal incorporation.
2. The ordinance under attack was enacted by New Harmony's City
Council after its Housing Committee heard testimony from several students of
American race relations to the effect that private discrimination and prejudice
are heightened by segregated housing patterns and lowered by integrated pat-
terns; that a community with a stable pattern of integrated housing would
enrich the lives of all its citizens by enlarging their relations with persons
of another race; that the semi-rural amenities of New Harmony would at-
tract as many persons from the Chicago area as the town could accommodate;
but that Whites either would not move to New Harmony or would tend to
leave if they thought they would come to be greatly outnumbered by Negroes.
There was agreement among these experts that legal restrictions on the oc-
cupancy of residences in New Harmony would be necessary to the suc-
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cess of a stable integrated community. Although their attention was fo-
cussed on occupancy, they recommended that the acquisition of property be
similarly restricted, on the theory that if land could be purchased (e.g., for
rental to others) without regard to the purchaser's race, the town might later
find it difficult to resist pressure from the owner for an exception to the
master plan allowing him to occupy his own property.
3. In its report to the City Council, the Housing Committee accepted the
validity of these views and recommended enactment of the "checker-board
ordinance" as the legal device most likely to achieve and preserve a pattern of
integrated housing in New Harmony. All persons who then owned land in
New Harmony (primarily the group that had purchased the area in 1962)
joined in a petition to the City Council endorsing the recommendation of the
Housing Committee.
4. The ordinance, with minor changes not here relevant, was enacted by
the City Council, and the mayor proceeded to classify every residential build-
ing lot in the manner described earlier. In the two years since then, many
houses have been built in New Harmony, and all property, whether improved
or not, is now owned and occupied in compliance with the ordinance, except
for the plot that is the subject of this lawsuit.
The parties are in agreement that the only question to be decided by us
is whether the ordinance violates the equal protection or due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.' They also
agree that several cases passing on the validity of racial quotas employed by
public housing agencies in the selection of tenants are not controlling.
2
In the opinion of a majority of the court, the Supreme Court decisions cited
by the district judge in giving judgment for the plaintiffs are as conclusive
as he found them to be.
In Buchianan v. Warley, supra, the Supreme Court held that an ordinance
enacted in Louisville, Kentucky, forbidding Negroes to move into or occupy
1. In their brief, the plaintiffs refer in passing to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (providing that all
citizens shall have the same right in every State to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real property as is enjoyed by white citizens), but they follow the lead of the
Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer in resting their case on the fourteenth amendment,
possibly because § 1982 does not explicitly guarantee equal rights in the use and occupancy
of real property.
No claim is made under the Illinois constitution, evidently because a 1963 test case be-
tween the Secretary of State and the town of New Harmony held that the ordinance was a
proper exercise of the power granted to the town by its charter.
2. In Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 668 (Cal. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954), a public housing authority's policy of providing low rent
apartments in proportion to the number of families of each racial group potentially eligible
for admission was held to violate the fourteenth amendment; see also Taylor v. Leonard, 30
N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954) (quota invalid) ; Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743
(E.D. Pa. 1941) (quota valid). Neither Banks nor Taylor was concerned with an affirma-
tive effort to achieve integration, and the Favors case, decided long before Brown v. Board
of Education, relied on Plessy v. Ferguson in finding that the housing authority had pro-
vided equal treatment to both races.
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houses in residential blocks that were predominantly occupied by white per-
sons, and imposing reciprocal restrictions on white persons, was unconstitu-
tional as violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
It is the purpose of such enactments, and, it is frankly avowed it will
be their ultimate effect, to require by law, at least in residential districts,
the compulsory separation of the races on account of color. Such action
is said to be essential to the maintenance of the purity of the races, al-
though it is to be noted in the ordinance under consideration that the em-
ployment of colored servants in white families is permitted, and nearby
residences of colored persons not coming within the blocks, as defined in
the ordinance, are not prohibited.
The case presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit the
amalgamation of the races. The right which the ordinance annulled was
the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do
so to a person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to
a white person.
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public
peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important
as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished
by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the
Federal Constitution.
It is said that such acquisitions by colored persons depreciate property
owned in the neighborhood by white persons. But property may be ac-
quired by undesirable white neighbors or put to disagreeable though
lawful uses with like results.
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in ques-
tion to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state inter-
ference with property rights except by due process of law. That being the
case the ordinance cannot stand. [245 U.S. at 81-82]
The principle of Buchanan v. Warley was later employed, in per curiam
opinions, to strike down a New Orleans ordinance forbidding a Negro to
occupy a residence in a "white community" without the written consent of a
majority of the Whites therein (and vice versa), and an ordinance of Rich-
mond, Virginia, prohibiting anyone from occupying a residence in an area in
which the majority of residences were occupied by persons with whom he
was forbidden to intermarry by Virginia's antimiscegenation statute. Harmon
v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) ; Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
In Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, the Supreme Court held that the enforcement
by a state court of a racial restrictive covenant, voluntarily adopted by private
parties, was "state action" that could not be distinguished, for constitutional
purposes, from the racial zoning ordinance that had been held unconstitutional
in Buchanan v. Warley. Although Buchanan was decided under the due pro-
cess clause (on the ground that the rights of a white seller had been un-
constitutionally restricted), in Shelley the Supreme Court rested its decision
on the equal protection clause, stating that "such legislation [the ordinance
in Buchanan] is also offensive to the rights of those desiring to acquire and
occupy property and barred on grounds of race or color .... ." 334 U.S. at 12.
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To the argument that equal protection of the laws would not be impaired
by judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant against Negro occupancy so
long as the courts stood ready to enforce covenants prohibiting white occupancy
of other property, the Supreme Court said in Shelley: "The rights established
[by the fourteenth amendment] are personal rights .... Equal protection of the
laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." 334 U.S.
at 22.
I conclude that Buchanan v. Warley and Shelley v. Kraemer establish an
absolute prohibition on the use of race or color as a criterion of state action,
at least in the area of land tenure and occupancy.
My conclusion is reinforced by Brown v. Board of Education, supra, hold-
ing that state laws requiring or permitting racial segregation of public school
pupils violate the equal protection clause. To be sure, the Court there
expressed the opinion that the separation of Negro school children "from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone," 347 U.S. at 494, thus
implying that the validity of legislation using race or color as a criterion of
individual rights depends upon whether it generates a feeling of inferiority
in one (or, conceivably, both) of the separated groups. But if the Court in-
tended to allow the constitutional propriety of racial separation in the public
schools to turn on its actual or probable results in each time and place, or
on the outcome of fragmentary and inconclusive experiments of the type re-
ferred to by the Court in a footnote, the opinion would surely have been writ-
ten in far less sweeping terms. Moreover, in referring to the adverse effects of
racial discrimination in the assignment of school children, the Court did not
distinguish, or even mention, other criteria commonly used in assigning
children to separate schools (e.g., age, sex, educational achievement, voca-
tional aims, geographical location, etc.), any of which may be felt by children
to stamp them and their schools as inferior. 3 Since I cannot believe that the
Court intended to outlaw by inference these criteria for assigning pupils to
schools or classrooms, I conclude that Brown v. Board of Education decided
that race is an improper criterion for the assignment of school children, re-
gardless of the consequences of such a classification. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's later decisions outlawing racial segregation in
public parks, buses, and golf courses in per curiam opinions that cited the
Brown case without suggesting that adverse consequences would be generated
by discrimination in these other public facilities. Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Mayor v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) ; New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege,
3. These criteria cannot be conclusively distinguished from race or color on the ground
that they bear a necessary relationship to the legitimate educational aims of the public
school system, since these educational aims could be advanced with less damage to the
child's pride by using separate classes or other devices short of separate schools. Cf. Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,304-05 (1940).
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358 U.S. 54 (1958). In short, I construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice
Harlan's famous statement that the "Constitution is color-blind."4
I cannot accept New Harmony's theory that its "checker-board ordinance"
is to be distinguished from the zoning ordinance in Buchanan v. Warley, from
the enforcement of the restrictive covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer, and from
the system of school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education on the
ground that they were designed to, and did, separate the races, while the "check-
er-board ordinance" serves the cause of integration. The announced purpose of
the Louisville zoning ordinance was "to prevent conflict and ill-feeling be-
tween the white and colored races," 245 U.S. at 70, an aim which, if not
identical with New Harmony's announced purpose, is at least consistent with
it and no less worthy. Publicly announced purposes, to be sure, may be exer-
cises in deception, or even in self-deception, but I have no tools for probing
below the surface of either Louisville's or New Harmony's announced pur-
pose; and our courts, whether from fear or humility, have traditionally re-
fused to inquire into the motives of legislators.5 And if we are to confine our
inquiry to the results of the state's action, I am not equipped as a judge to
decide whether New Harmony's ordinance will contribute more than Louisville's
zoning scheme to racial amity or whether either would be more efficacious than
complete freedom of movement-and I would not know whether to compare
their results, even if I had the tools to predict them, on a short-run or long-
run basis, on a local or national scale, or in terms of outward behavior or
inward attitude. The one fixed star that I can make out in this area is that the
Supreme Court did not hesitate in Shelley v. Kraemer to prohibit judicial en-
forcement of a covenant that may have been, and probably was, the principal
reason why an area that had enjoyed mixed Negro and white occupancy for a
generation had not become a Negro ghetto. 6 And in doing so, the Court used
language that admits of no distinction between high-minded and low-minded
covenantors.
I conclude, therefore, that the district court's judgment, holding New
Harmony's ordinance to be unconstitutional, was correct and should be
affirmed.
Judges BAKER and CARSON concur; Judge DANIEL concurs in an
opinion to be filed at a later time.
4. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). See also the formulation in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 307 (1879) : ... the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the
white ...."
5. If the validity of the State's action is to depend upon motive, whose would be con-
trolling in Shelley v. Kraemer: the persons who originally entered into the covenant, the
persons who asked for judicial enforcement, or the court itself ?
6. The covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer was signed in 1911 by thirty landowners; four
white and five Negro non-signers lived in the same district. When the action was begun
35 years later, four of the latter premises were occupied by Negroes, and had been so oc-
cupied for periods ranging from 23 to 63 years. A fifth parcel had been occupied by Negroes
until a year before the action was begun. Record, pp. 2-3, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), holding that a restrictive covenant
applicable to a block of long-standing mixed occupancy in the District of Columbia could
not be judicially enforced.
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EVERETT, Circuit Judge (dissenting)
The fourteenth amendment is almost one hundred years old, and its life has
been replete with irony: railroads, utility companies, banks, employers of child
labor, chain stores, money lenders, aliens, and a host of other groups and institu-
tions have all found nurture in the due process and equal protection clauses,'
leaving so little room for the Negro that he seemed to be the fourteenth
amendment's forgotten man. This despite the Supreme Court's early recogni-
tion that "the one pervading purpose" of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments was to insure "the freedom of the slave race, the secur-
ity and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 71 (1872). Indeed, so clear was it, in those days when the Civil
War was still a fresh memory, that the Negro was the object of the fourteenth
amendment's solicitude that the Supreme Court said of section 5 (authorizing
Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the amendment) : "We
doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of dis-
crimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will
ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." 83 U.S. at 81. The
kaleidoscope of life often refuses to reflect our confident predictions, but sel-
dom has a forecast been so completely lost to sight. Even so, the crowning
irony comes today, when the racial zoning, restrictive covenant and school
segregation cases, which had begun to restore the fourteenth amendment to
the Negro, are used as weapons to destroy the first local legislation to
ameliorate the condition of the Negro that has passed in review before this
court.
I
Although the majority's use of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917),
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) to invalidate New Harmony's ordinance may be super-
ficially appealing, a more careful examination shows that reliance on these
cases is an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence.2 The announced purpose of
the municipal zoning ordinance in Buchanan v. Warley, supra, was to require
"as far as practicable, the use of separate blocks for residences, places of abode
and places of assembly" by Negroes and Whites, 245 U.S. at 70, in order to
achieve, as the Kentucky Court of Appeals put it, the "enforced separation of
1. See FRANKFURTER, MR. JUsTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT, Appendix I
(Cases Holding State Action Invalid Under the Fourteenth Amendment) (1938).
2. The process was acidly described by Justice Cardozo:
Out of the vague precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment a court frames a rule which
is general in form, though it has been wrought under the pressure of particular
situations. Forthwith another situation is placed under the rule because it is fitted to
the words, though related faintly, if at all, to the reasons that brought the rule into
existence.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
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the races". 165 Ky. 559 at 570, 177 S.W. 472, at 476 (1915). Whether this
was done "to prevent conflict and ill-feeling" between the races, as the
ordinance recited, 245 U.S. at 70, or for less worthy objectives, separation (or
segregation, to use a blunter but no less accurate term) was both the purpose
and the effect of the ordinance.
Whatever view may be taken of the basis and scope of Buchanan, its hold-
ing cannot be fairly applied to the New Harmony ordinance. To the extent
that Buchanan held that the Louisville ordinance was invalid as an undue
restriction on a landowner's right to dispose of his property,3 it necessarily
rests upon a determination that the police pgwer of the state does not include
a power to require "the compulsory separation of the races on account of
color." But this sheds no light on whether the state's police power may be
employed to achieve integration in housing. If Buchanan is viewed more
broadly as invalidating all "state legislation discriminating against [the Negro]
solely because of color" (245 U.S. at 79), it does not tell us when legislation
"discriminates against" a racial group. Any legislation that treats individuals
(minors, women, men of draft age, veterans, lawyers, Indians, etc.) as mem-
bers of a class necessarily distinguishes them from others; but the legislation
does not "discriminate" (in an invidious sense) if the classification is validated
by some appropriate purpose or effect.
The New Harmony ordinance imposes inconveniences on some landowners
and their prospective customers or tenants; the issue before us is not the exis-
tence of these restrictions, but their constitutional propriety. Buchanan invali-
dated legislation requiring Negroes and Whites to live apart; but it does not fol-
low ineluctably that legislation requiring them to live together is equally invalid,
any more than a holding that the state may not inject its citizens with disease
germs would imply that compulsory vaccination is equally bad. The Louisville
and New Harmony ordinances are different in purpose and effect; while I do
not suggest that the invalidity of the former leads automatically to the validity
of the latter, this seems to me a better working hypothesis than the majority's
insistence that the invalidity of the one proves the invalidity of its opposite.
The Constitution may be color-blind, but it is not short-sighted.
3. In finding that the Louisville ordinance was an unconstitutional "interference with
property rights" because it limited the landowner's right to dispose of his property,
Buchanan strikes an antiquated note, while the opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
upholding the ordinance, is more harmonious with the contemporary judicial view of free-
dom of contract:
The jus disponendi has but little place in modern jurisprudence. The advance of
civilization and the consequent extension of governmental activities along lines
having their objective in better living conditions, saner social conditions, and a
higher standard of human character has resulted in a gradual lessening of the
dominion of the individual over private property and a corresponding strengthening
of the regulative power of the State in respect thereof, so that today all private
property is held subject to the unchallenged right and power of the State to impose
upon the use and enjoyment thereof such reasonable regulations as are deemed ex-
pedient for the public welfare.
165 Ky. at 569, 177 S.W. at 476 (1915).
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Shelley v. Kraemer leads no more compellingly to the result reached by
the District Court than does Buchanan v. Warley. In Shelley, the Supreme
Court held that a state court's action in enforcing a private racial restrictive
covenant violated the fourteenth amendment, even though "the particular pat-
tern of discrimination . . . was devised initially by the terms of a private
agreement," 334 U.S. at 20, because the state "made available to [the pri-
vate individuals who sought to enforce the agreement] the full coercive power
of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the en-
joyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell." 334
U.S. at 19. Shelley is even less pertinent than Buchanan v. Warley to the
validity of the New Harmony ordinance, since Shelley was concerned entirely
with state action to enforce, through its judiciary (and, potentially, its execu-
tive officers), an ad hoc, private agreement totally divorced from any public
plan for the regulation of race relations. It has been suggested that the
Supreme Court's action in Shelley may have unsettled a neighborhood of
mixed racial occupancy, and from this is drawn the inference that the Court
has set its face resolutely against any public plan to achieve integration. Per-
haps Shelley forbids judicial enforcement of private convenants designed in
good faith to "stabilize" neighborhoods of mixed racial occupancy, 4 although
it was not argued that the convenants there before the Court had this purpose
or effect, and it is appropriate here to recall what Justice Sutherland said in
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) :
Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the atten-
tion of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been
so decided as to constitute precedents.
It may even be-though I am far from clear on the point-that Shelley forbids
the judiciary to enforce private restrictive covenants even if they are executed
in conformity with a public master plan for integration of an entire commun-
ity; at least, it is arguable that such an arrangement would improperly trans-
fer the invocation of governmental power to private hands. But I reject
totally the argument that Shelley condemns the New Harmony ordinance,
which gives no public sanction or support whatsoever to private prejudice.5
4. Where such devices are not in pursuance of a public plan, but are put into effect by
the ad hoc decisions of private persons, they (unlike the New Harmony ordinance) .vill al-
most inevitably fail to provide a comprehensive system of adequate alternatives for those
whom they exclude on racial grounds. The opinion of the district court in Progress Develop-
ment Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. II. 1960), re7ld in part and remanded, 286
F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961), which found a private real estate developer's plan to impose a
"benign" quota to be objectionable, might have been implicitly based on this theory. See
also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), upholding a state court injunction
against picketing to compel a private employer to hire personnel in proportion to the racial
origin of its customers.
5. The line of forbidden conduct marked by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is crossed only when a State makes prejudice or intolerance
its policy and enforces it....
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 178 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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The school segregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, is also misap-
plied by the majority when it is employed to invalidate New Harmony's
ordinance. In holding that a state cannot segregate pupils in the public school
system by race, the Supreme Court did not explicitly or by implication sug-
gest that the state can take no action to foster integrated housing or even
integrated schooling. The relevant part of the Brown case, for present pur-
poses, is its recognition of the psychological wounds inflicted by racial segrega-
tion; just as these evils led the Supreme Court to invalidate school segrega-
tion laws, so they have led New Harmony to enact its "checker-board ordin-
ance." Hence, the Brown case and New Harmony's ordinance may be properly
viewed as parallel therapeutic measures directed against a similar evil. 6 I
cannot accept the theory that New Harmony, in seeking to destroy segrega-
tion in residential housing, has violated the same Constitutional provision
that was violated by state laws requiring segregation in public education. The
principle that a classification may be proper for one purpose but improper for
another seems so reasonable-indeed, so indispensable to any system of law-
that one wonders at finding it challenged. Men who did not serve in the armed
forces were denied the benefits of the "G.I. Bill of Rights": does this mean
that they could have been required to wear yellow arm bands? The indigent
receive relief benefits from the government: may their children therefore be
required to sit at the rear of the class in public schools?
Once we recognize that the case now before us was not decided, explicitly or
by necessary implication, by Buchanan v. Warley, Shelley v. Kraemer, or
Brown v. Board of Education, we are free to examine the issues it presents on
the merits.
II
Setting aside for a moment the plaintiffs' equal protection argument, and
confining our attention to their due process objection to New Harmony's
ordinance, 7 the question before us reduces itself to this: Is the regulation
6. I say "similar" rather than identical, since the Brown case frustrated official segrega-
tion, while the New Harmony ordinance seeks to destroy unofficial segregation; this distinc-
tion is undoubtedly important in some contexts, but it does not invalidate my argument that
the district court overlooked a kinship between Brown v. Board of Education and New
Harmony's ordinance and erred in regarding them as in opposition. In fact, although the
issue in Brown was the constitutional validity of official segregation, the Court there quoted
with approval from a lower court opinion which spoke of the detrimental consequences of
segregated education even when not imposed by law: "Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact
is greater when it has the sanction of the law ... ." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954). Moreover, many of the deficiencies that led the Supreme Court to hold
that a separate Negro law school was not equal to the white law school at the University of
Texas, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), are also to be found in schools that are all-
Negro as a consequence of residential concentration rather than official segregation.
7. It is not easy to separate the equal protection objection from the due process objection,
especially since the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education under the equal
protection clause but on the same day held school segregation in the District of Columbia
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"reasonable in relation to its subject and... adopted in the interests of the
community"? West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
If so, it is a valid exercise of the state's police power, and the restrictions it
imposes on the plaintiffs do not "deprive" them "of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." It is common knowledge that throughout our
nation most urban Negroes live in well-defined geographical areas, and that
they can escape from these de facto ghettoes, if at all, only by unremitting per-
sistence in the face of hostility and deception by property owners, real estate
brokers, financial institutions, and neighborhood associations. The informed
students of American race relations who appeared before New Harmony's
Housing Committee attributed many evil conditions to this concentration of
Negro housing and argued that its dispersion will serve to ameliorate these
conditions. They also asserted that such a dispersion of Negroes would serve
to combat widely-accepted racial misconceptions that are a barrier to equal
opportunities in education, employment, public life, and other aspects of our
society.8 When these observers turned their attention from the Negro to the
White, they asserted that de facto segregation does such harm to the dominant
race that Whites are its victims as well as Negroes, in what has been called
"this fated mutuality that inheres in all inflicted wrong" by Black, The Law-
fulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 428 (1960). New
Harmony's ordinance, it is argued, will disabuse its white citizens of their
misconceptions of the Negro, and thus improve their ability to come to terms
with the world they live in.
Perhaps both the diagnosis and the remedy proffered by these students of
American race relations are too facile, but it is not our function to decide
whether this be so or not. It is enough that we cannot say that New
Harmony's City Council acted arbitrarily when it launched its experiment in
"normalizing" Negro housing. As the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, said in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, at 262 (1952) :
Only those lacking responsible humility will have a confident solution
for problems as intractable as the frictions attributable to differences of
race, color or religion. This being so, it would be out of bounds for the
judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not un-
unconstitutional under the due process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Despite this, the plaintiffs have invoked the two constitutional clauses separately, and I
have followed the organization of their brief.
8. The Supreme Court has had occasion recently to refer to the opinion of many
observers that the individual in our society is "inextricably involved" with the status of
groups to which he belongs, especially if his affiliation is unavoidable rather than voluntary:
It is not within our competence to confirm or deny claims of social scientists as
to the dependence of the individual on the position of his racial or religious group in
the community. It would, however, be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of
our authority in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the Illinois
Legislature may warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportuni-
ties and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial
and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,263 (1952).
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related to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on
the State's power. That the legislative remedy might not in practice
mitigate the evil, or might itself raise new problems, would only manifest
once more the paradox of reform. It is the price to be paid for the trial-
and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate social issues.
"The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, in-
deed, that can be called a science which has but few fixed principles, and
practically consists in little more than the exercise of a sound discretion,
applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the science of
experiment."
So far as due process is concerned, I do not find that New Harmony's
ordinance differs in any vital respect from other social legislation that has
been upheld by the Supreme Court in the recent past. Consider, for example,
what was said in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish in upholding Washington's
Minimum Wages for Women Act:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize
an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social
organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which
menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under
the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due pro-
cess, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is
adopted in the interests of the community is due process. 300 U.S. at 391
(1936).
Or what was said in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), in sustaining the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional ap-
plication of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely il-
lustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it .... Miserable and
disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and
crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the
people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make
living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore,
a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place
from which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community
as an open sewer may ruin a river ....
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
lean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case,
the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that
take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise
them. 348 U.S. at 32-33.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's remarks in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), upholding an Oregon statute prohibiting the employment of women
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in laundries in excess of ten hours per day, might be applied to Negroes with
only minor emendations.
[Man] established his control [over woman] at the outset by superior
physical strength, and this control in various forms, with diminishing
intensity, has continued to the present .... Education was long denied
her, and while now the doors of the school room are opened and her
opportunities for acquiring knowledge are great, yet even with that and
the consequent increase of capacity for business affairs it is still true that
in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her
brother. 208 U.S. at 421-22.
New Harmony's ordinance does, of course, restrict the right of an owner to
sell his property to whomever he chooses, but we have long since acknowl-
edged that this right is subject to many limitations. The landowner's economic
interest is no more sacrosanct than the business man's; and I see no warrant
for applying a different standard of constitutionality than was applied to the
economic regulation of retail milk prices by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934) :
These correlative rights, that of the citizen to exercise exclusive
dominion over property and freely to contract about his affairs, and that
of the state to regulate the use of property and the conduct of business,
are always in collision. No exercise of the private right can be imagined
which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public; no
exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen
which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property.
But subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield
to the public need ....
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the ab-
sence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and
to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are
without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by
the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a rea-
sonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. 291
U.S. at 524-25, 537.
It is, of course, not only the landowner who relies on the due process clause.
The would-be purchaser wants to live where he chooses, and argues that he is
being deprived of this "liberty" without "due process of law." But this argu-
ment either coincides with his equal protection argument, which I will discuss
shortly, or it is no more valid than the landowner's reliance on due process.
For we have no longer, if we ever had, an unrestricted right to live where we
choose: one cannot live even on his own property if it is zoned for commercial
or industrial purposes; one cannot live in a tent if the building code requires
a fireproof roof; one cannot live with a friend if his home is restricted to
single-family occupancy. To be sure, freedom of movement within the
country is embraced within the "liberty" protected by the fifth and fourteenth
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amendments; and I can agree with the abstract proposition that if one cannot
come to rest, his movement is restrained. Nor would I disagree, again on a
high level of abstraction, with the assertion that if one is officially excluded
from enough places, the space that is left may be properly labelled a concentra-
tion camp. But these assertions merely lay the foundation for judicial review
by showing that we are confronted with a real, not a frivolous, claim; they fall
far short of proving that the claim should be honored. In essence, the would-be
purchaser complains that he is not allowed to acquire and occupy every house
in New Harmony, but only every other one. But this restriction on his freedom
to live where he wishes, taken alone, is too mild to permit us to say that New
Harmony is guilty of unreasonable and arbitrary action in determining that
the values served by imposing this restriction outweigh those that are denied
by it.
In alleging that he has been deprived of liberty without due process of law
by the ordinance, the would-be purchaser also invokes "freedom of associa-
tion." He points out that if he wants Negro neighbors, he cannot have them
next door, but only next door once removed, and that he must live next to a
white family even if this is distasteful to him. Of greater moment than the
denial of these idiosyncratic preferences is the fact that he cannot live in a
Negro "neighborhood," at least not in New Harmony, even though he may
think that will foster a cultural tradition, reduce social abrasions, and protect
his children from the temptations of mixed marriages. He complains that we
profess cultural pluralism, but destroy the group life that is its prerequisite,
and he argues that the erosion of folkways by contemporary modes of com-
munication and other institutions is so rapid that our national life is in
danger of losing its savor.
I am not disposed to dispute this prediction. America is a melting pot, and
homogeneity seems to be our destiny. At any rate, freedom of association is
already denied in our public life: the Constitution itself prevents us from
selecting our associates when we serve in Congress, on a jury, in the armed
forces, or in a government bureau; and we are frequently compelled by federal,
state, and local legislation to put up with unwelcome associates if we ride on a
railroad, stay in a hotel, eat in a restaurant, work for a private employer, or
join a labor union.9 Of course, the plaintiff does not ask that he be allowed
to select his associates in those walks of life where this freedom could be
secured only by denying to others the freedom to serve on juries, work for the
government, live in public housing projects, or attend the public schools
nearest their homes. But he argues that as to private housing, the government
has no affirmative duty to insure freedom of access; and in this area, he as-
serts that he should be allowed to choose his own associates. This claim to free-
9. See generally, MuRRAY, STATEs' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950 and 1955 Supp.) ;
Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526 (1961) ; statutes cited in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 382
n. 24 (1946). See also Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) ; City of Highland Park v. Fair Employment Prac-
tices Comm'n, 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W. 2d 797 (1961) ; note 11 infra.
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dom of association cannot be reconciled with legislation barring racial dis-
crimination by labor unions and employers, since decisions upholding the
constitutional validity of such legislation 10 necessarily held that freedom of
association is only one of the values to be weighed by the legislature, and that
within limits it may be subordinated to other values. If freedom of association
can be denied in these areas in the interest of enlarging the opportunities of
members of minority groups, it can be as properly denied in the area of land
tenure and occupancy. 1
In passing on the validity of New Harmony's ordinance, we not only must
defer in large measure to the legislative balancing of public values, but also
must weigh the fact that the ordinance seeks to remedy evils stemming in part
from unconstitutional behavior by government in times past. I refer, of course,
to federal, state, and local laws and practices discriminating against Negroes in
the administration of public school systems, government employment, public
housing, and the armed forces. Some, indeed, have argued that private race
prejudice is so much the heritage of past unlawful official action that some
private acts of discrimination, at least in our day and age, violate the four-
teenth amendment. They view the restauranteur, employer, or landlord who
refuses to deal with a Negro as a kind of brain-washed automaton for whose
conduct the state, which set him in motion, must remain responsible until he
can be said to have regained the power to think independently.' 2 It is not
necessary to go this far, however, to reach the conclusion that official complic-
ity in racial discrimination in past years enlarges the public interest in official
corrective measures today. Even though no part of today's private prejudice
may be ascribed to the past official acts of New Harmony, that community is
not acting the busybody in attempting to alter a social pattern that was in
large part shaped by affirmative, and often formal, governmental action. 13
10. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, supra note 9.
11. Surely land tenure and occupancy are no more matters of exclusively "private"
concern than employment. For legislation prohibiting racial discrimination not only in
"publicly-assisted" housing, but in all multifamily units, see U.S. CviL RIGHTS COMMIsSION,
1961 REPORT ON HOUSING Appendix VI, Table 1 (198-99) ; McGhee and Ginger, The House
I Live In, A Study of Housing For Minorities, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 194, 216-38 (1961).
12. It was recognized as early as the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that §
5 of the fourteenth amendment authorizes Congress "[t]o adopt appropriate legislation for
correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them
effectually null, void, and innocuous." Id. at 11. It would seem at least consistent with this
view of § 5, if not to follow a fortiori from it, that without waiting for Congress to act,
a state may itself take appropriate action to correct the lingering effects of any unlawful
discrimination it may have practiced in the past, and it is not really a giant step from this
to state legislation counteracting the local fallout produced by unlawful state action in other
parts of the country.
13. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), the Supreme Court upheld a
war-time curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry, in part because earlier legal restrictions
imposed on such persons (with respect to immigration, naturalization, land tenure, etc.)
may have diminished their loyalty to the United States-so that old legal disabilities became
the foundation for new ones. We are concerned here, to the contrary, with a present attempt
to correct past injustices-an effort with which it is hard not to sympathize.
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III
I turn now from the due process arguments advanced by both plaintiffs to
the equal protection argument made by Smith, the Negro plaintiff, who is
prevented by New Harmony's ordinance from purchasing and occupying a
plot designated as "W". I have already set out my reasons for believing that
this issue is not foreclosed, as the majority asserts, by Buchanan v. Warley,
Shelley v. Kraemer, or Brown v. Board of Education. Moreover, I can find
nothing in the history of the equal protection clause to support the claim that
is here founded on it. Assuredly the clause guaranteed that Negroes might
inherit, hold, and dispose of land-legal powers that had hitherto been widely
denied to them-as freely as Whites, but New Harmony's ordinance does not,
in my opinion, deny equality before the law in the purchase and occupancy of
land.
To be sure, in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court held that the equal pro-
tection clause forbade a state court to enforce a restrictive covenant excluding
Negroes even though the same state court stood willing to enforce a hypothetical
covenant excluding Whites from other property. In rejecting this attempt to
adapt the "separate but equal" principle to land tenure and occupancy, the Court
said that the equal protection clause created "personal rights" and that
"[e] qual protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposi-
tion of inequalities." 334 U.S. at 22. But one need know only a little about the
economic status of Negroes in our country in 1948, when Shelley v. Kraemer
was decided, to see that the argumentative attempt to equate covenants ex-
cluding Negroes with a hypothetical covenant excluding whites was hardly
more than a cruel joke, like "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as
well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."
In speaking of "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities" the Court referred to
our society, not to Utopia; and in saying that the rights established by the
fourteenth amendment are "personal rights," the Court was using a short-
hand expression, not forging a tool for the analysis of all legal problems in
race relations that may arise in the indefinite future. Thus, the fact that the
right to acquire and hold land was secured to the Negro by the equal protec-
tion clause does not dispose of the case before us, where (unlike Shelley v.
Kraemer) there is no inequality in the amount or character of the land avail-
able for purchase by Negroes and Whites respectively.
It is argued that the equal protection clause as drafted and ratified was un-
derstood to outlaw all distinctions based on race, so that it is violated by local
legislation forbidding a Negro to acquire or occupy land that can be freely ac-
quired or occupied by a white person. But no such unequivocal rejection of
racial distinctions can be found in the "original understanding" of the equal
protection clause. Indeed, it was not even understood to guarantee to Negroes
the right to vote; that assurance came only with the fifteenth amendment.
And in Brown v. Board of Education, though recognizing that the "most
avid proponents" of the Civil War amendments "undoubtedly intended them to
remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the
United States,"' the Supreme Court could not say that this view was broadly
[Vol. 71:1387
AN EXPERIMENT IN RACE RELATIONS
shared; and it was forced to conclude that the fourteenth amendment's history
was "inconclusive" with respect to segregation in public schools. The "original
understanding" may have tolerated other racial distinctions as well, such as
antimiscegenation laws and the exclusion of Negroes from juries.14 Thaddeus
Stevens, at any rate, having hoped from youth to old age to see the day when
"no distinction would be tolerated in this purified Republic but what arose
from merit and conduct," said of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment that it
merely patched up "the worst portions of the ancient edifice, ... leaving it, in
many of its parts, to be swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and the
storms of despotism."' 5
Even if the equal protection clause had been understood as accomplishing
all that its "most avid proponents" had wished, it would still have been a
response to the practical issue then before the country: the extent to
which the Negro should be protected by the Constitution and Congress from
hostile state and local legislation. This was recognized by the Supreme Court
when the legislative battles that can today be followed only by resuscitating old
newspapers were still fresh memories, and it led the Court to say in 1879 that
the fourteenth amendment conferred on Negroes:
[T]he right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them dis-
tinctively as colored-exemption front legal discriminations, implying
inferiority in civil society... and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race. Strauder v. West Vir-
gina. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). (Emphasis added.)
As to the validity of state and local legislation whose purpose was to achieve
an integrated pattern of housing, the possibility of such legislation was
so remote when the fourteenth amendment was adopted that we cannot even
say that the question "was lurking in the record," let alone that it was authorita-
tively answered. The New Harmony ordinance may or may not be wise, but
surely Negroes-or, for that matter, Whites-cannot properly indict is as
"unfriendly legislation," as "legal discrimination implying inferiority," or as
a step towards "reducing them to the condition of a subject race."
When I turn from the original understanding of the words making up the
fourteenth amendment to "the line of their growth' 06 to see whether New
Harmony's ordinance stands condemned by the equal protection clause as ex-
perience has led the courts to interpret it, I find that the Supreme Court has
recently summarized the standards imposed by this clause on state and local
14. The most recent historian of the subject concluded that § 1 "as originally
understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation
statutes, nor segregation," and found no shift in this understanding while the amendment
was being ratified. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. REv. 1, 58 (1955). Writing a few years earlier, Frank and Munro, in The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 CoLum. L. REV. 131, 145, 162 (1950),
had "considerable doubt" about equality in jury service and were unable to reach an as-
sured conclusion as to antimiscegenation statutes.
15. Bickel, supra note 14, at 55.
16. Justice Holmes, in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914), quoted
by Bickel, supra note 14, at 6.
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legislation in language that is virtually identical with what it has said about
the due process clause:
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that
[the equal protection clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment permits the
States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is
offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.... McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
Racial segregation in the public schools, when tested by this standard, is
unconstitutional because the classification "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant"
to the achievement of the state's educational objectives and because the com-
pulsory separation of the races cannot be defended as an independent alterna-
tive objective. This is why Brown v. Board of Education is not inconsistent
with the Japanese curfew and exclusion cases, in which the Supreme Court
upheld first a curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry and then their total ex-
clusion from the West Coast during wartime. Because racial distinctions
often-indeed, usually-stem from racial antagonism or hatred, they are "by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
Even when they are merely irrelevant to any proper public purpose, they are pro-
hibited. But given a proper purpose to which the racial classification is instru-
mental, the equal protection clause does not condemn it.
Viewed in this light, New Harmony's racial classification is readily seen to
be appropriate to the achievement of a reasonable public objective-the reduc-
tion of racial discrimination and prejudice 17 -and it is consistent with other
racial classifications that have been tolerated, or even generated, by the
Supreme Court because they served legitimate governmental objectives. These
precedents for New Harmony's ordinance include:
1. Legal restrictions on American Indians. The legal restrictions on Amer-
ican Indians, recognized and enforced by the federal judiciary, are so numerous
as to defy cataloguing.' 8 For present purposes, it is enough to note that many
Indians are treated as wards of the United States and are forbidden to dispose
of both tribal and individual property until certified as competent to handle
their own affairs by the Secretary of the Interior. Even if this requirement
were regarded as merely a procedural device for insuring that an Indian who
wished to dispose of property was compos mentis, it would impute presump-
tive incompetence to a group of persons on the basis of blood.19 In point of
17. When it was argued to the Supreme Court that a state did not have the constitu-
tional authority to forbid racial discrimination by a labor union, the assertion was described
in a concurring opinion as "devoid of constitutional substance," and the majority opinion was
almost as summary. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
18. See generally, U.S. DEPr. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIrAN LANW (1958).
19. [E]xperience shows that generally spealdng the greater percentage of Indian
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fact, however, more is involved than such a procedural presumption, since
the test of "competence" as applied to Indians is different from that applied
to Whites. To obtain a certificate of competency, an Indian must show that he
has "at least sufficient ability, knowledge, experience, and judgment to enable
him to conduct the negotiations for the sale of his land and to care for,
manage, invest, and dispose of its proceeds with such a reasonable degree
of prudence and wisdom as will be likely to prevent him from losing the
benefit of his property or its proceeds." United States v. Debell, 227 Fed. 760,
770 (1915) ; see also Act of August 11, 1955, ch. 786, 69 Stat. 666, 25 U.S.C.
section 355 (1958) ; Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 '(1956) (special
status of Indians, with respect to competence, recognized after Brown v. Board
of Education). As to a White, the absence of such business skill might warrant
a court in removing him as a trustee of someone else's property, but it would
hardly be enough to forfeit his right to dispose of his own property. A striking
example of this disparity in the standards applicable to Indians and Whites is
that Charles Curtis, although he became Vice President of the United States,
was an "incompetent Indian" who could not dispose of certain property with-
out the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.2 0
2. Racial distinctions in attacks on exclusion from state jury service. If
Negroes are systematically excluded from jury service by a state court, the
conviction of a Negro violates the fourteenth amendment, Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), but this objection to the manner in which
juries are chosen is entertained only if the defendant belongs to the excluded
class. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) ; Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261 (1947) ; Scott, The Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal
Crimnnal Juries, 34 IowA L. REv. 577, 590-94 (1949) .21 This distinction between
white and Negro defendants can hardly rest on the white defendant's lack of
"standing"-he surely has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
blood a given allottee has, the less capable he is by natural qualification and ex-
perience to manage his property."
United States v. Shock, 187 Fed. 862, 870 (1911).
See also DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGEs 399 (1956):
Experience shows that liquor has a devastating effect on the North American
Indian and Eskimo. It is, therefore, commonly provided in the United States and
Canada that no liquor should be sold to those races. Other regulations based on race
may likewise be justified by reason of the special traits of those races, such, for
example, as their susceptibility to particular diseases.
Mr. Justice Douglas goes on to point out that "what at first blush may seem to be an
invidious discrimination may on analysis be found to have plausible grounds justifying it."
20. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 553 (1958).
21. In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), the Supreme Court said that the practice
of upsetting state convictions when Negroes were excluded from jury service rested on a
statutory foundation, 18 Stat. 336 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 44 (1958), and that it is unnecessary to
find "prejudice" against the defendant, "for Congress has forbidden [such exclusions], and a
tribunal set up in defiance to its command is an unlawful one whether we think it unfair or
not." 332 U.S. at 293. But this statement cannot be taken at face value, since it does not
explain why a tribunal that is "unlawful" can properly convict white defendants. In exercis-
ing its power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts, it is
worth noting, the Supreme Court forbids improper exclusionary practices without regard to
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versy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult consti-
tutional questions," which was said in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962),
to be "the gist of the question of standing." Nor can it be explained as a necessary
procedural expedient for insuring that the Negroes excluded from jury service
will have a champion, even an unworthy one, of their constitutional rights; they
have a remedy of their own. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,303 (1950) (dis-
sent). And, if this remedy be thought inadequate (because, by hypothesis, it has
not cured the evil), they would be as well served by white as by Negro cham-
pions.22 The distinction, rather, appears to stem from a premise of racial
solidarity: that all-white juries will discriminate against Negro defendants, by
being either less than fair to them or more than fair to white defendants.2 3
To the extent that the Negro defendant is allowed to invoke the due process
clause, the premise is that a jury from which Negroes are intentionally ex-
cluded will not give him a fair trial ;24 the alternative equal protection founda-
"whether the petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion or whether
he was one of the excluded class." Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946).
Soon after the Fay case, the Court returned to its habit of vouching the fourteenth
amendment itself as the authority for its action, Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950),
which is not unnatural, since the statutory provision is an exercise of the power granted to
Congress by § S of the amendment.
22. When a defendant in a criminal case alleges that Negroes have been systematically
excluded from jury service, is he asserting a jus tertii? Yes, if he is White; no, if he is a
Negro, according to a recent study, Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional lies Tertii in
the Supreme Court, 71 YA=m L.J. 599, 658 (1962). But if the defendant in a criminal case
is entitled to be tried before a jury representative of the whole vicinage, not just of those
subgroups to which he belongs, a white defendant is no more relying on jus tertii than a
Negro in complaining of the exclusion of Negroes.
Indeed, if the jury system is a device for insuring fairness in the administration of
criminal justice, rather than an aspect of self-government (like voting), it is the excluded
juror-not the defendant-who is claiming in jus tertii; and it might even be thought that
these actions are unnecessary in view of the lively interest defendants in criminal cases have
in objecting to exclusionary practices.
23. In United States v. Harpole, 263 F. 2d n, 79 (5th Cir. 1959), there is a suggestion
that all-white juries are objectionable because they will be too lenient with Negroes who
commit crimes against other Negroes, thus denying adequate personal protection to the
law-abiding members of a Negro community. Perhaps so, but then Negro defendants would
be unlikely to object to the exclusionary practice, at least not if its abandonment might
produce enough Negro jurors to affect the composition of the jury before which they
would be tried. The theory of the Harpole case, therefore, would suggest that white de-
fendants should be allowed to act as champions of the Negroes excluded from jury service.
24. It is obvious that discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from a trial jury does, or
at least may, prejudice a Negro's right to a fair trial, and that a conviction so obtained
should not stand. The trial jury hears the evidence of both sides and chooses what it
will believe. In so deciding, it is influenced by imponderables-unconscious and
conscious prejudices and preferences-and a thousand things we cannot detect or
isolate in its verdict and whose influence we cannot weigh. A single juror's dissent is
generally enough to prevent conviction. A trial jury on which one of the defendant's
race has no chance to sit may not have the substance, and cannot have the appearance,
of impartiality, especially when the accused is a Negro and the alleged victim is not.
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,301-02 (1950) (dissent).
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tion for reversing such convictions (which is more commonly encountered in
the opinions of the Supreme Court, when one clause is singled out) is that
white defendants will be treated more generously by all-white juries than
Negroes, so that even though the brand of justice meted out to Negroes would
be constitutionally unobjectionable if applied to all, a weaker brand is given
to Whites. "The inquiry under [the equal protection] clause involves de-
fendants' standing before the law relative to that of others accused ... . to
shunt a defendant before a jury so chosen as greatly to lessen his chances
while others accused of a like offense are tried by a jury so drawn as to be
more favorable to them, would hardly be 'equal protection of the laws.'" Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947).
3. Race as a factor in testing constitutional validity of criminal convictions.
In reviewing criminal cases in which violations of the due process clause have
been alleged (e.g., denial of counsel, involuntary confessions, unreasonable de-
lays in arraignment, etc.), the federal courts have often referred to the de-
fendant's race or color. Without suggesting that race or color were crucial in
all of these cases, or indeed in any, I cannot believe that they were merely
neutral circumstances, like the defendant's social security number. Race, to
the contrary, has been treated as a relevant circumstance, like the defendant's
youth, poverty, illiteracy, or friendlessness, in judging whether he received due
process of law. Rigorous proof of racial prejudice has not been demanded,
however, and it would not be unreasonable to describe these cases as exercises
of benevolent vigilance thought necessary to protect Negroes as a class from
improper practices by the police and trial courts.
Each of these legal distinctions based on race or color (to which I might
add the Japanese curfew and exclusion cases) 25 has its own rationale, which
finds in the history, traditions, customs, and attitudes of the community a
foundation for the conclusion that race or color is relevant to some public
decisions. The distinctions may not be equally justified, and they of course
do not lead to the conclusion that race or color is always an appropriate basis
for official behavior. But I cannot regard the instances I have cited above as
forming a closed circle to which no other racial distinctions can be admitted.
As for the racial zoning, restrictive covenant, and school segregation
cases, I have already pointed out that they do not necessarily invalidate social
legislation of a remedial character that imputes no inferiority to any racial
group, any more than they invalidate legislation that limits the freedom of
women or children in the interest of correcting a social or economic evil. In-
deed, whereas such legislation restricts women or children while leaving men
or adults free, New Harmony's ordinance imposes the same restrictions on
both Negroes and Whites, and is, if anything, more clearly even-handed. In
short, I find nothing unreasonable in the classification employed by the ordin-
ance to achieve its ends, and for the reasons set out earlier in this opinion
these ends seem to me well within the range of permissible legislative action.
I would reverse the judgment below, and dismiss the complaint.
25. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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DANIEL, Circuit Judge (concurring)
For me, the critical fact in this case is that New Harmony will not allow
the Negro plaintiff to purchase or occupy a plot of land that may be purchased
or occupied freely by any white person.' His freedom to live where he wishes
is restrained by New Harmony's ordinance just as clearly as it would have
been by the Louisville racial zoning ordinance that was annulled as unconstitu-
tional in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)-and, whatever view may
be taken sub specie aeternitatis of the New Harmony and Louisville experi-
ments in social control, an individual Negro may equally resent the restriction
imposed on him whether it feeds New Harmony's program for achieving racial
harmony or Louisville's. While I agree with Judge Everett that the question
before us was not authoritatively answered by Buchanan v. Warley, supra,
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947), and Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), I cannot accept his conclusion that the ordinance is
consistent with the equal protection clause. Thus, I concur in the majority's
decision, though I reach it by a different route.
1. As will be seen, I do not find it necessary to reach the claim that the ordinance
restrains "freedom of association" by preventing persons of all races from living where
they choose. But I must confess that I do not think this objection is adequately answered
by Judge Everett's opinion. Of course, no one has the right to select the persons with whom
he will associate in public schools or in government service, nor would I dispute the
power of state or federal legislative bodies to deny this right in some other aspects of
life. At the same time, it is clear to me that there are limits to legislative power in this
area, and that modern civilization's assault on privacy may in time persuade us that a
measure of freedom of association, not only in the home but outside it as well, is a pre-
requisite to the preservation of a free society. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for
a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. Rlv. 473, 491-505 (1962) ; see also Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Oldstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) ("the right to be let alone
-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men"). As to
the possibility, indeed certainty, that such a freedom of association would be invoked for
base as well as noble ends, see Pound's dissent in People v. Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 158, 136
N.E. 317, 327 (1922) (". . . the rights of the best of men are secure only as the rights of
the vilest and most abhorrent are protected.").
The extent to which legal protection should be accorded to freedom of association is
undeniably vague, but in this respect it resembles the right to travel, protected in Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); the right to marry and have children, see Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ; the right of parents to control their children's education, see
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) ; the right to refuse to affirm a belief, West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; and the right to engage in intellectual inquiry, see Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Judicial support for
these freedoms seems exotic not because they are beyond the range of constitutional protec-
tion, but because, happily, they have rarely been invaded by our legislative bodies. And, just as
judicial stewardship of these liberties is not forestalled by the paucity of precedents, so I
do not doubt that the freedom to choose one's residence would be protected in a proper
case. Even those who reject natural law concepts in determining the scope of the liberties
that are listed in the Bill of Rights acknowledge that others, not explicitly mentioned, may
be brought within the nation's pledge that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law."
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Our inescapable starting point is the Supreme Court's formulation in Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) : "Distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
For me, this warning was in no sense weakened by the Court's refusal in
Hirabayashi to invalidate a curfew imposed in war-time upon persons of
Japanese ancestry when "attack on our shores was threatened by Japan" or
by its later refusal in Korernatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) to
invalidate a war-time military order excluding such persons from a military
area on the West Coast. Sober, and somber, second thoughts about those
ventures in racial distinctions should impel us, rather, to look suspiciously at
even the most seductive proposals for racial experiments. 2 I cannot, therefore,
accord to New Harmony's ordinance a presumption of innocence: rather,
since it denies a Negro, solely because of his race, the right to do something
that may be done by a white person, New Harmony must bear the burden of
proving that its action is consistent with the equal protection clause.
At one level, the ordinance is defended on the theory that its restrictions
inflict no injury because the land and houses affected are not sufficiently
differentiated to make any difference to a rational person. The parties are in
agreement that the lot in litigation is located in a large area consisting solely
of similar plots of land and that the parts of New Harmony that have been
built up contain only so-called "tract houses," so that for every house, there
are dozens of others substantially the same in construction, equipment, and
outvard appearance. Because these assertedly undifferentiated building lots
and houses have been designated "N" and "W" in equal number, New Har-
mony argues that its ordinance damages neither Negroes nor Whites. I agree
that the ordinance here is different from the zoning law in Buchanan v. War-
icy, where the Negroes may have been, and probably were, confined to de-
teriorated sections of the city, and that it is also different from the private
covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer, where there was not even a pretense of equal
housing opportunity. But Anglo-American law has always regarded every plot
of land as unique, whether it be an Englishman's castle or an American com-
muter's split-level home in the suburbs. This may be why the doctrine of
"separate but equal" accommodations, as enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), was not even discussed in the Buchanan and Shelley
cases.
Moreover, New Harmony itself has decided that every plot, whatever its
physical characteristics, is unique. The only reason for labelling a building
lot or residence "W" or "N" is to set it aside for a special use; having
espoused the principle that the color of one's next-door neighbor is important,
New Harmony is hardly entitled to argue that the plot which Smith wants but
cannot buy is no different from others that he can buy but does not want. The
2. As Justice Jackson said of the Hirabayashi case: "I think we should learn some-
thing from that experience." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944). See
Rostow, The Japanese Ainerica Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
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traditional concept of the uniqueness of every parcel of land may be outmoded
for some purposes, but it cannot be properly rejected in this case, where the
litigated plot is viewed as unique by both the plaintiffs and the defendant.
At a more fundamental level, New Harmony asserts that the racial classifica-
tion employed by the ordinance is justified by the social ends that it serves. We
are asked to defer to the legislative judgment unless we can say with as-
surance either that it is wholly capricious or that it has the purpose or effect
of humiliating or stigmatizing persons because of their race or color. I will
speak later of the difficulties of determining whether legislation "humiliates" or
"stigmatizes"-pausing only long enough to note that the objects of legislation
rarely share the outlook and assumptions of its draftsmen-and will direct
my attention first to the theory that the field of race relations is an appropriate
area for judicial deference to legislative decisions, at least when they do not
produce humiliation or stigma.
Let us be clear about what has been proposed by the Town of New Har-
mony and accepted, if I understand him, by Judge Everett. It is that the
due process clause, as applied to the substantive content of legislation, "de-
mands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained," Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934),
and that the equal protection clause is violated by a classification of persons
"only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the State's objective" but not "if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it," McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). If
these are indeed the appropriate criteria, and if they are to be applied to
experiments in race relations as indulgently as they are applied to economic
regulation, I would agree that New Harmony's ordinance is unexceptionable.
Let us see, however, what other legislative experiments in race relations would
be permissible if these are the appropriate criteria. "I am not borrowing
trouble by adumbrating these issues nor am I parading horrible examples
.... I am aware that we must decide the case before us and not some other
case. But that does not mean that a case is dissociated from the past and un-
related to the future. We must decide this case with due regard for what went
before and no less regard for what may come after." Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 660-61 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1. Other routes to integration. New Harmony's ordinance uses the in-
dividual residence or building lot as the unit to build its checkerboard, but
in other communities common sense or professional advice may favor varia-
tions under which alternate city blocks or wards will be employed. Judge
Everett's opinion would seem to uphold or reject racial zoning having the
formal characteristics of the ordinance invalidated in Buchanan v. Warley,
depending upon whether we as judges think it will turn out to be a transitional
measure, fostering a spirit of tolerance and thus eliminating the conditions that
brought it into being, or a self-fulfilling prophecy, preventing the growth of
tolerance and thus supplying the need and justification for its own perpetua-
tion.
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Still other communities may decide, again in the interest of achieving and
preserving an integrated pattern of housing, to depart from New Harmony's
50-50 ratio of Negro and white accommodations in favor of a ratio correspond-
ing to the local, state, or federal ratio of Negro and white families; or a ratio
thought most likely to attract or to hold Whites; or a ratio thought to produce
the ideal "mix" for fostering good "interpersonal relationships." Indeed, it
is reported that some public housing projects are already experimenting with
"benign" quotas on Negro occupancy, under which apartments are denied to
qualified Negroes and rented to Whites, whose priority would be lower except
for their race, in order to achieve integrated occupancy, thus substituting "bal-
anced occupancy" for their earlier goal of "open occupancy."'3
Restrictions on the acquisition and occupancy of residences in selected com-
munities are obviously not the only mode of achieving integrated housing and,
given our nation-wide mobility, they may turn out to be ineffective. If
we tolerate such restrictions on the theory that they are reasonable modes of
achieving a benevolent end, however, I can see no basis for caviling at public
subsidies, such as bonuses to landlords whose apartments enjoy a mixed
occupancy, grants to Negroes to enable them to rent apartments or purchase
homes in residential areas that would otherwise be beyond their means, 4 or
payments to induce white families to move to or stay in integrated neighbor-
hoods.
Although New Harmony's social experiment focuses on housing as the most
promising arena for improving racial harmony, other communities may prefer
to start elsewhere-with the public school system, for example. If the state
or local legislative body may impose "benign" quotas on public housing pro-
jects or racial restrictions on the ownership and occupancy of private homes,
why may it not also permit Negroes (but not Whites) to transfer out of public
schools with a high concentration of Negro children,5 limit the percentage
of Negroes in any one school by requiring "excess" Negroes to go to other
schools, rezone school districts to form areas that are racially "balanced" but
geographically and otherwise irrational,6 permit only Negroes of superior
3. See Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960) ; Note, Racial
Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 538-50 (1959) ; Comment, 59 MIcH.
L. RLv. 1054 (1961) ; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 44 (1961).
4. The New York Times reported that "economic barriers appear to be replacing so-
cial discrimination as the most formidable obstacle to racial integration [in New York
City]." Id., Oct. 22, 1961, § 8 (Real Estate), p. 2R, col. 8.
5. Under New York City's Open Enrollment Plan, pupils are allowed to transfer from
so-called "sending" schools (those whose student population is either 90% Negro and/or
Puerto Rican or 90% "other") to so-called "receiving" schools (75% or more "other" if
facilities are underutilized by 10% or more). NEw YORK CIrY BD. oF EDUCATiON, THE
OPEN ENROLLMENT PROGRAM, PROGRESs REPORT 3 (1961). If white as well as Negro
pupils exercised their option to transfer out of a Negro-dominated school, the plan could
result in an increase in the percentage of Negroes left behind. For this reason, the
New Harmony approach to integration suggests a variation on the New York plan, under
which only Negroes would be allowed to leave a predominantly Negro sending school.
6. See Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 350
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ability to transfer to "white" schools lest intimacy with below-average Negroes
confirm the stereotype of inferiority, or otherwise treat school children differ-
ently, because of their race, in the interest of a higher good ?7 Similarly, since
Negroes are "under-represented" in colleges and universities, may the state
seek to redress the balance by requiring a certain number of places to be set
aside for them, forbidding the admission of Whites (or of such white racial
or religious groups as are "over" represented) until the balance has been re-
dressed," granting racially restricted scholarships, or requiring a differential in
tuition charges?
It is notorious that the number of Negroes in administrative and profession-
al posts is far below the percentage of Negroes in the working force. No doubt
many students of race relations, if put to a choice, would prefer to start with
employment rather than with housing in an effort to "normalize" Negro life.
If New Harmony may reserve every other building plot for Negro occupancy,
may not Negroes be given compensatory credit on civil service examinations
(as was done for veterans)? If this is permissible, may the state take the
more direct route of restricting the tenure of public jobs so as to prevent
Negroes from holding more than their "share" of menial, or less than their
"share" of executive, positions ?9 Indeed, may not the same rule of propor-
U.S. 1006 (1956). Cf. the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figttre" that was found offensive, as a
municipal boundary, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
7. .1 am referring, of course, to plans for "integration" whose treatment of individuals
"is based wholly upon color; simply that and nothing more" (Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 73 (1917)), resembling in this respect the system of school segregation con-
demned in Brown v. Board of Education. I do not mean to intimate any doubt about the
assignment of remedial or other special teachers to schools with a below-average educa-
tional achievement, or the abandonment of the "neighborhood school" principle in favor of
city-wide schools, or the location of new schools in areas of racially mixed rather than
concentrated occupancy, where individuals are not singled out for special treatment because
of their race. A community that builds one city-wide high school, for example, obviously
produces a racial mixture in the student body that would not occur if several neighborhood
schools were constructed, but whether it does one or the other, it will not have to distin-
guish between one pupil and his neighbor on the basis of race and it will produce a host of
nonracial educational results. It may be, of course, that one or more of the many persons,
private and official, who have a voice in or an influence on such a decision will value its racial
consequences more highly than its other consequences, but I do not regard such possibilities
as susceptible to judicial inquiry.
8. The President's Commission on Higher Education, in its report Higher Education
for American Democracy (1947), reported that Negroes represented about 10% of the
total population of the United States, but accounted for only 3.1% of the enrollment
in institutions of higher education. Although disclaiming any endorsement of racial
quotas, the Commission also noted that Jewish medical school students declined from
16.1% (1935) to 13.3% (1946) of the total enrollment. It is not clear whether the Com-
mission would have thought this decline required "particular consideration" if there had
been a corresponding increase in the percentage of Negroes enrolled in medical schools.
Yet it is obvious that if the percentage of medical students of Negro descent increases, the
percentage of whites-whether Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant-must decline.
9. This would call for a revival of the theory of Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743
(E.D. Pa. 1941) (housing authority may allocate public housing in proportion to the "need"
of each race), which I had thought was discredited by Brown, v. Board of Education.
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tionate representation be imposed by federal, state, or local legislation on pri-
vate businesses and the professions?
Although the theory is now in desuetude, respectable authority once argued
that if Negroes devoted their talents to "self-improvement" in modest en-
deavors, prejudice would wither away as their achievements came to com-
mand the respect and admiration of their fellow citizens. If experiments in
race relations are to become the order of the day, some Negro leaders and
state or local legislatures may conclude that the creation of model "Negro
communities" would be the best route to ultimate integration. If so, may
municipal boundaries be redefined to produce such a community, despite
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), on the theory that the Negroes
thus isolated have been given political control of the inner, rather than denied
political participation in the outer, community? If benevolence in its con-
ception confers legitimacy on such gerrymandering, can it later lose its birth-
right if, for example, the Negro insiders should come to prefer a union with
the white outsiders to form a single larger community ?1o
With the elimination of official segregation in the public school system in
some parts of the country still a long way off, some will no doubt think that
proposals to go beyond this minimum public goal are only speculative exer-
cises. But our country is riding two trains, and one is moving rapidly ;11 be-
fore long, it may generate as much litigation as the slow train through Dixie.
Witness, on this question, Fortune magazine:
The city, in short, must exercise "positive discrimination" in favor of
the Negro if it is to enable the mass of Negroes to compete with whites on
equal terms. The U.S. must learn to look upon the Negro community as
if it were an underdeveloped country. (March 1962, p. 151).
10. Except for the Sunday Closing Law cases, the courts have not often been called
upon to decide whether a statute serves a purpose different from its purposes at enact-
ment; and in those cases, the legislatures had provided a running commentary on the
statutes in question in the form of frequent amendments. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) ; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) ; Two Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); see also Nashville C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Waiters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935) (effect of changed circumstances on con-
stitutionality of legislation).
11. A few straws in the wind, in addition to those already mentioned:
A quota system to insure racial integration at summer camps for youngsters was
advocated here today by Dr. David Barry, executive director of the New York City
Mission Society .... Dr. Barry said that camps should have an ethnic balance as
part of the function of democracy.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1958, p. 73, col. 4.
Jerry R. Holleman, Assistant Secretary of Labor and executive vice chairman
of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, disclosed.. . that
stress was being put on efforts to have labor unions adopt its Plans for Progress
In achieving equal employment opportunity, he declared, it may sometimes seem
that the Negro worker is favored for a job over a white man.
"I am fully aware that some seeming inequities may result from efforts to undo
the inequities of the past," he added. "You cannot bring into balance a Negro un-
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See also Grodzins, The Metropolitan Area As a Racial Problem (1958), in
which a leading political scientist recommends "experimentation with vari-
ous systems of controlled migration" to control the movement of Negroes
into particular urban and suburban areas ("fostering a smaller discrimination
in favor of scotching a larger one"), "experiments with all-Negro suburban
communities," encouragement of Negro migration to small cities because
they "are greatly underrepresented in virtually all places outside the South and
the larger urban areas of the rest of the country," and measures to attract white
residents back to large metropolitan areas.12
2. Other minorities. Although Negro-white relations are in the forefront
of much thinking about American society today, we have other minorities
whose residential, occupational, and educational patterns may be thought
abnormal. In condemning "de facto segregation" in the public school system
(and, by inference, in housing and other aspects of life), public officials and
even scholars often fail to make clear whether they are referring only to
Negroes, or to any minority that may be distinguished by race, color, religion,
national origin, language used in the home, economic status, cultural tradition,
or other characteristics. 13 In one sense, we are all members of minority groups.
employment rate double that of whites without a stepped-up rate of hiring Negroes.
You cannot give a Negro a long-overdue promotion without denying some other
persons that same promotion.
"To us these truisms are basic to the quarantee of equal employment opportunity.
And yet, we must realize there are those who would like to keep the status-quo or
even reverse it."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1961, p. 15, col. 4.
An auxiliary probation system for Negro criminals, under which church com-
mittees Will work with the city probation unit, was announced this week by Judge
Raymond Pace Alexander, a former member of the city council .... The plan al-
ready has been approved by two large church groups, the African Methodist Epis-
copal and the Baptist churches. Other major church groups with Negro members
are expected to join the program.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1959, p. 53, col. 1.
12. While some of Professor Grodzins' recommendations contemplate private exhorta-
tion and action rather than official racial restrictions, it is almost inevitable that many
persons will be unwilling to rely on private efforts and will seek to implement recommen-
dations of this type With state and local laws and regulations. Grodzins himself suggests
at least some official action to create interracial suburban communities:
It is commonplace for federal legislation to establish conditions that must be met
by local governments before they qualify for financial aid. The question arises: is it
possible to write a federal law that would supply aid for community facilities on a
priority basis to those suburbs containing a given minimum of Negro residents?...
Clearly no requirement based directly upon a racial classification would meet con-
stitutional standards. Yet it is not beyond the realm of legal creativity to find an-
other scheme of definition that would foster the end of racial distribution and yet
remain within constitutional limits.
GRODZlNS, THE METROPOLITAN AREA As A RAcIAL PROBLEm 24 (1958).
13. Thus, New York City's "Open Enrollment Plan," supra note 5, classifies schools
according to their percentages of Negro, Puerto Rican, and "other" students; see also
NEW YORK Crry BD. oF EDUCATION, TowAi GREATER OPPORTUNITY 155 (1960). By this
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Even if the term "minority" is confined to groups that are small in relation to
our national population and that are subjected to pressures or pre-
judices that have a noticeable effect on their geographical distribution,
persons of Chinese, Mexican, Italian, Puerto Rican, Jewish, and many
other ancestries would qualify.14 If we are to bow to the legislative judg-
ment that racial quotas, restrictions, subsidies, and other carrots and sticks are
desirable ways to correct the social and economic conditions of Negro life, I
see no basis for applying a different principle in reviewing legislative experi-
ments with these other groups.
taxonomy, a school with a 100% Jewish or Italian population is not a "minority" group
school. But in generalizing on the value of a mixed student body, the New York Board of
Education does not restrict its comments to schools with a predominantly Negro or Puerto
Rican population:
By its very nature, as well as by its demonstrated effects, the concentration of racial
minorities in the classroom and in the schoolyard inflicts psychological wounds on
the segregated group. But it also, more or less inevitably, tends to provide it with
an education that is substantively less adequate than that enjoyed by the majority
group, even though the latter, too, may suffer socially and psychologically through
its isolation from the minority.
Whether school segregation is the effect of law and custom as in the South, or
has its roots in residential segregation, as in New York City, its defects are inherent
and incurable. In education there can be no such thing as "separate but equal."
Educationally, as well as morally and socially, the only remedy for the segregated
school is its desegregation.
COMMISSION ON INTEGRATION, NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, TOWARD THE IN-
TEGRATION OF OUR SCHOOLS 6 (1958).
For a more explicit argument in support of integrating all groups, not just Negroes, see
the following:
Just as we make it possible for youngsters to have hot lunches or to supplement
their educational diet with those things that help to make them healthy and well-
rounded, so it is that we have to aggressively structure the composition of a school
so that they learn with girls, boys, higher, upper, middle-income youngsters, Negroes,
whites, Jews, Catholics and anything else that we have in the population.
Dr. Jeanne L. Noble (speaking for Dr. Dan Dodson), Fourth Annual Education Confer-
ence, U.S. Comm. on Civil Rts., May 4, 1962, transcript p. 383.
14. Although the New York City Board of Education's statement of principle (quoted
note 13 supra) speaks of "racial minorities," Puerto Ricans (who are embraced by the
Open Enrollment Plan) are racially very divergent. See Gordon, Race Patterns and Prej-
udice in Puerto Rico, 14 AM. Soc. REv. 294 (1949) ; Gordon, Cultural Aspects of Puerto
Rico's Race Problem, 15 AM. Soc. REv. 382 (1950); Siegel, Race Attitudes in Puerto
Rico, 14 PHYLON 163 (1953). What homogeneity they possess by reason of national origin,
culture, economic status, use of a foreign language, recent arrival on the mainland, etc.,
does not seem markedly different from the common characteristics of many other groups
in our nation. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) :
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily identi-
fiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in securing equal
treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from time
to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups which
need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a
question of fact.
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3. Other legislative ends. New Harmony argues that its ordinance is an
appropriate means of achieving its objective of integrated housing, which, in
turn, is expected to increase white understanding and acceptance of Negroes
as individuals and thus to diminish the public and private barriers to Negro
advancement in education, public life, employment, and other areas of public
concern. But integration is not the only way that these ends may be served, nor
are these the only ends of civil society. If the development and preservation of
group traditions and customs may be regarded as proper objectives of legis-
lative action, the courts may be asked to apply the "hands-off" principle for
which New Harmony contends here to legislative measures of a very dif-
ferent type. Let it not be forgotten that Negroes as conservative as Booker
T. Washington and as radical as W. E. B. DuBois both perceived certain
advantages in segregated public education.15 While they may have merely
sought to make a virtue of necessity, other leaders of racial, religious, and
national groups-conscious of the corrosive effects of modern American life
on minority traditions and customs-may well invoke our commitment to
cultural pluralism in asking federal, state, and local legislatures to preserve the
character of local neighborhoods, schools, recreational facilities, and other
institutions by keeping outsiders out and insiders in.
4. Other foundations for legislative judgments. I have confined myself so
far to social experiments in race relations that might be undertaken on the
advice of sociologists, social psychologists, psychiatrists, and other professional
students of our public life. While these groups may be generally agreed, at a
high level of abstraction, on the direction in which public policy on race re-
lations should lead us, they obviously entertain a welter of conflicting views
about specific remedies. Moreover, if our approach to economic regulation is
the touchstone of constitutionality, legislation can be "reasonable" and there-
fore beyond judicial control, whether there is a consensus of professional
opinion to support it or not. The famous "Brandeis Brief" contained a mass of
opinions about the medical, economic, social, and moral dangers of long hours
of employment, and the converse merits of short hours, but it was not as-
15. In 1935, on the premise that prejudice against Negro school children "is not going
materially to change in our time," DuBois argued that "[w]e shall get a finer, better
balance of spirit; an infinitely more capable and rounded personality by putting children
in schools where they are wanted, and where they are happy and inspired" and criticized
the use of children "as a battering ram." DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?.
4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 331 (1935). After adducing these "negative arguments for separate
Negro institutions of learning based on the fact that in the majority of cases Negroes are
not welcomed in public schools and universities . . . ," he added that "there are certain
positive reasons [for separate institutions] due to the fact that American Negroes have,
because of their history, group experiences and memories, a distinct entity, whose spirit
and reactions demand a certain type of education for its development." Id. at 333.
The doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities itself stems from a lawsuit concerning a
school for Negro children that had originally been a private school for Negroes who
wished to shield their children from the prejudice they encountered in the Boston public
school system. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1849). See Levy & Phillips, The
Roberts Case: Source of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 56 Am. HIST. REv. 510
(1951).
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serted that these opinions were universally accepted by experts, or even that
they were correct. The material was adduced, rather, to establish only that the
legislators had some "ground on which they could, as reasonable men, deem
this legislation appropriate to abolish or mitigate the evils believed to exist
or apprehended."' 16 By this lenient test of constitutionality, legislation based
16. THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS
66 (Fraenkel ed. 1934), identified as Brandeis' oral argument in Stettler v. O'Hara, 243
U.S. 629 (1917) (presumably when first argued in 1914) by FREUND, ON UNDERSTAND-
ING THE SUPREIE COURT 126 (1949).
The Brandeis brief itself was made up largely of opinions expressed by physicians, so-
cial workers, factory inspectors, and legislators, much of the material being so general,
ambiguous, or vague as to resist efforts to establish its truth or falsity.
The standards of relevance and competence applied in compiling the material did not
exclude a multiplicity of statements like these:
It is the idea of the German Emperor [1890] that the industrial question de-
mands the attention of all the civilized nations ....
The quest of a solution becomes not only a humanitarian duty, but it is exacted
also by governmental wisdom, which should at once look out for the well-being of
all its citizens and the preservation of the inestimable benefits of civilization.
Brief for Appellee, p. 48, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Bleachers in a petition to their employers, 1853: We believe the result generally
is such as to corroborate our statement that short hours produce more work and
that of a better quality than under the old system.
Id. at 65.
During the agitation for the ten-hours bill in the year 1844 or 1845, he (a cotton-
spinner at Preston [England]) reduced his time voluntarily to eleven hours instead
of twelve, and at the end of twelve months he reported, as Mr. Hugh Mason did,
that he had got a better quality of work and more of it in the eleven hours than he
had in the twelve, and that is obvious to anybody who understands the process of
following a machine.
Id. at 67.
In a cigar-box and wrapper-mold factory [in Kassel, Germany] all adult workers
were given uniform working hours in summer and winter-a nine-hour day, from
seven to six, with two hours free time at noon. The owner asserts that in this shorter
time no less work is done than formerly in the longer time, the eleven-hour day.
Id. at 69.
B. used to work [in a British printing plant] from 8 A.M. to 8 P.M. regularly,
including Saturdays .... She disliked overtime, was tired out at the end of a day's
work, and thought the other women were too, and she had often noticed how badly
the work was done after eight or nine hours of it. Later on, as a forewoman, she
noticed that the girls after overtime always loafed about the next day and did not
work well.
The comparative immunity from accidents in the laundries in the West Riding
of Yorkshire may be possibly due in some measure to the moderate hours of employ-
ment.
Id. at 109.
If the matter could be gone into carefully, I think the committee [Select Parlia-
mentary Committee on Shops Early Closing Bill] would be perfectly surprised to
find what a large number of these women are rendered sterile in consequence of
these prolonged hours .... I know of one case where four members of a family who
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wholly on old wives' tales might be rejected,17 but almost anything else would
pass muster.
The Town of New Harmony itself does not want this test of constitutionality
to be applied in full strength to legislative judgments in the field of race
relations, but proposes that it be diluted by the "humiliation" or "stigma"
exception. Social experimentation would be halted, under this test, if the
effect of the legislation was to humiliate or stigmatize its objects. The segrega-
tion of school children by race or color is regarded as an illustration of such
legislation, and Brown v. Board of Education as an example of the appropriate
judicial response. Of course, I concur in this characterization of racial segrega-
tion in the public school system in our day and age, and agree that its humili-
ating effects are manifest even if not necessarily intended by all of its pro-
ponents. And I would also agree that racial segregation in public parks, buses,
and golf courses are merely other facets of the same system, which can hardly
be viewed independently, even though they might deserve or require separate
examination under other circumstances.' 8
were shop-girls were sterile, and two other girls in the family, not shop-girls, have
borne children.
Id. at 37.
Wherever you go ... near the abodes of people who are overworked, you will
always find the sign of the rum-shop.
Id. at 45.
Progressive physical deterioration produced by family labor in factories. It is well
known that like begets like, and if the parents are feeble in constitution, the children
must also inevitably be feeble.
Id. at 51.
A reduction in hours has never lessened the working-peoples' ability to compete
in the markets of the world.
Id. at 65.
What is the greatest desire of the factory operatives? We reply, beyond all
question, one of the greatest desires of the factory operatives of America, relative
to employment, is for ten hours.
Id. at 101.
The report for the district of Chemnitz [Germany, 1888] says that the manufac-
turers of that district have repeatedly espressed a desire for the introduction of the
ten-hour day.
Id. at 103.
17. Unless the legislative body's action ipso facto establishes the rationality of the
legislation, so that whatever is, is reasonable.
18. Such legislation might, of course, miss its mark if the segregated group refused
to acquiesce in the majority's depreciation of them and instead viewed the legislation as
proof of the majority's insecurity, ignorance, or barbarism. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 551 (1896), to the effect that if "the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority .... it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."
Whatever naivete, insensitivity, or disingenuousness this may have displayed as a conclu-
sion from the facts there before the Court, it cannot be denied that a minority group may
sometimes successfully reject an attempt to humiliate it.
It is worth recording, for its bearing on the defendant Town's claim that we must dis-
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But even the most well-intended legislation may be felt as humiliating by
its objects, and especially so in a country that professes that "all men are
created equal." When a Negro is told that he may not purchase property
labelled "W," the rebuff is not necessarily softened for him, however others
may feel about it, by the fact that other property is reserved for him or that
Whites are subject to parallel restrictions as to "N" property. I do not chal-
lenge the sincerity, or even the truth, of New Harmony's assertion that inte-
grated housing will confer benefits on Whites as well as on Negroes in ex-
pressing doubt that the asserted benefits to Whites would have independently
prompted the enactment of the ordinance and in suggesting that many persons
will feel that it must stand or fall on the theory that its limitations on the
would-be Negro purchaser are imposed "for his own good."'19
Viewed in this light, the ordinance carries with it the offensive implication
that is the unfortunate but seemingly inevitable concomitant of official charity
or paternalism. 20 Beyond that, it rests on, or is tantamount to, an official find-
tinguish between good and bad racial distinctions, that the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson,
supra, itself accepted this theory; and, indeed, applied it: while sustaining segregation in
public transportation, the majority reserved judgment on the suggestion that by the same
token Negroes and Whites might be required to walk on different sides of the street or to
paint their houses different colors, saying that the police power "extend[s] only to such
laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the
annoyance or oppression of a particular class." Plessy v. Ferguson, mspra at 550.
19. A resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations speaks of "a funda-
mental distinction between discriminatory laws and practices [concerning race], on the
one hand, and protective measures designed to safeguard the rights of the indigenous in-
habitants, on the other hand." General Assembly Resolution 644 (VII) (Dec. 10, 1952),
in U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC., 7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 33, at 10-11, 14 (A/
2296) (1952). But the Resolution goes on to recommend that such measures "should fre-
quently be examined in order to ascertain whether their protective aspect is still predomi-
nant, and whether provision should be made for exemption from them in particular cir-
cumstances." Ibid. The Resolution is concerned only with laws affecting territories that
are not self-governing; whatever application it might have by analogy to the American
Indians, as an indigenous population, the Constitution surely does not permit Congress
and the states to enact general "protective" legislation for Negroes or any other racial
group of citizens.
20. A recent report of a committee of the New York City school system aptly illus-
trates this point: Teachers and principals are advised to avoid the use of the terms "low-
income or underprivileged children" and "culturally-deprived children' because they have
come to have a pejorative connotation, and to substitute "children unable to secure much
beyond the necessities of today's world because of the modest finances of their family"
and "children whose experiences, generally speaking, have been limited to their immediate
environment." CoMMrrTEE TO STUDY OBJECTIONABLE TERMS, NEW YORK SCHOOL BOARD,
REPORT 15 (1961). If the useful life of a euphemism is short, it may be that the phrase is not
intrinsically offensive, but that the persons to whom it is addressed have an unchanging at-
titude toward the idea it expresses.
In deciding the disputed issue of an Indian's federal income tax liability for profits
realized on a sale of timber cut on allotted land, the Supreme Court construed the Internal
Revenue Code consistently with a federal "purpose of bringing [Indians] finally to a state
of competency and independence" so that they can, "go forward when declared competent
with the necessary chance of economic survival in competition with others." Squire v.
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ing that Whites will not live side-by-side with Negroes except under legal com-
pulsion. Perhaps this will be regarded by some as an official condemnation of
the attitude of Whites, in no sense reflecting adversely on Negroes; but just as
many Negroes could not write off racial segregation in the public schools as
merely a monument to white inhumanity, so I doubt if the implications of the
New Harmony's ordinance will leave them unscathed. Rather, many Negroes
may ask themselves, as victims of private prejudice often do, what they have
done to instill such distaste in others; and this inward search-made more
acute by the fact that similar legal measures are not deemed necessary for
other minority groups-may be equally destructive of self-esteem whether the
finding that integrated housing cannot be achieved without legal compulsion
is correct or not. Moreover, the very fact that the finding is a considered
judgment from a friendly and official source, rather than an irresponsible or
transitory gesture of private hostility, may well enlarge the contribution it makes
to self-doubt.
No one has alluded to another inescapable problem created by New Har-
mony's well-intended ordinance: although it does not define "White" or
"Negro," it cannot be administered without rules and procedures for dis-
tinguishing white persons from Negroes. Since the town clerk is forbidden
by the ordinance to record a deed, lease, or other conveyance unless the pur-
chaser or tenant is qualified to acquire or occupy the property, he will ordinar-
ily be the first governmental official to inquire into a purchaser's or tenant's
race. New Harmony asserts that the proper racial classification will rarely be
in dispute; and that in such peripheral cases as may arise, the town clerk will
be required to receive evidence and decide the issue in accordance with the
rules of procedural due process applicable to any other administrative de-
cision. As to the courts, New Harmony argues that they will not be called
upon to review the correctness of any such determination by the town clerk,
since an erroneous classification of an individual, though it may pro tanto im-
pair the success of the master plan, will not diminish the number or quality of
the houses and building lots which he may acquire or occupy. The town clerk's
determination can have no other legal consequences, it is argued, either be-
cause the individual's race will be irrelevant by virtue of the equal protection
clause (as in the case of public employment or education) or because, if it
should become relevant to some official action, it will be open to re-examina-
tion at that time in the light of the criteria that make it relevant.
The argument is ingenious, but unsound. We cannot shut our eyes to the
radiating influence of a misclassification in the social and other aspects of
private life (recognized by the law in libel actions based on false statements
about one's race) ; indeed, the ordinance itself derives both its impetus and its
appeal from a candid appraisal of the effects of race on a person's social,
Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956). But for some Indians (including possibly the taxpayer,
who was considered competent enough to serve in the armed forces in wartime), even the
ostensibly pure advantage of tax exemption may have a bitter aftertaste since it is pre-
scribed as "remedial" legislation for persons who are "incompetent."
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economic, psychological, and political life, and thus refutes the wishful claim
that a misclassification can do no one any harm. For this reason, as well as
because the ordinance may be enforced by legal actions brought by the town's
corporation counsel without a prior determination by the town clerk of the
defendant's race, I conclude that the courts will necessarily be drawn into the
business of determining the race of persons wishing to acquire or occupy
property in New Harmony.
In discharging this responsibility, the courts will not get much aid from
either the natural or the social scientists. Biologists and physical anthropolo-
gists are prepared to define race in wholesale categories by physical traits, but
they are not trained for the retail business of classifying individuals. It is
unlikely that the species howno sapiens was ever divided into "pure" races; but
if it was, the fact that members of the species are both cross-fertile and
migratory unquestionably means that virtually all of us would prove to be of
mixed blood if the geneticists were to discover an infallible means of tracing
the racial inheritance of individuals.2 1 If we turn from biology to cultural
anthropology, ethnology, or sociology for help, we find race defined in cul-
tural terms; but these definitions, like those of the biologist, will be of little as-
sistance to the courts, which must classify individuals, not amorphous
groups.2 2
We are, of course, not without statutory and judicial guides in this area.
States with segregated public school systems have had long experience in de-
ciding who is "White" and who "Negro," and antimiscegenation laws pro-
vide us with ample and exquisite, though often conflicting, categories. 23 We
could even take our principles of taxonomy from Hitler's Germany or today's
South Africa,2 4 on the theory that its principles are being turned to a good
use by New Harmony. Whether we use domestic or imported standards, and
21. DonzrANsxy, MANKIND EVOLVING 183-91, 253-86 (1962); STEPr, PsuNcnr.s
or HUMAN GENETics 680 (2d ed. 1960) ; MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA Ch. 5 (1944) ;
SIMPsoN & YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND
DiscR mINATrO 37-68 (1958 rev. ed.).
22. MYRDAL, AN AmERICAN DmEMAMA 136 (1944). "[T]he concept of the American
Negro is a social concept and not a biological one."
23. Legal Definition of Race, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 571 (1958) ; MANGUM, THE LEGAL
STATUS or THE NEGRO 1-17 (1940) ; MURRAY, STATES' LAws ON RACE AND COLoR (1950
and 1955 Supp.) (see "Negro, definition of" under state name in Index.).
See Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), in which proof of
the defendant's race, in a suit (prior to Shelley v. Kraemer) to enforce a restrictive cove-
nant excluding "any person or persons except those of the Caucasian race," consisted of the
following testimony by the plaintiff:
I have seen Mr. McGhee, and he appears to have colored features. They are more
darker (sic) than mine. I haven't got (sic) near enough to the man to recognize his
eyes. I have seen Mrs. McGhee, and she appears to be the Mullato type.
316 Mich. at 620, 25 N.W.2d at 641.
24. See Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation, I: Fundamental Structure, 71
Y'ALR L.J. 1, 4-16 (1961).
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whether we rely on geneological records, physical traits, or reputation, how-
ever, the determination of an individual's race in a disputed case is dirty busi-
ness, and I would keep all branches of government out of it whenever
possible.25
I am not moved to retreat from this position by the instances cited by
Judge Everett of racial distinctions now tolerated by the law. As to the
Japanese exclusion cases, Hirabayashi and Korenatsu, the Supreme Court's
warning that such distinctions "are by their very nature odious to a free
people" is at least as important as the judgments themselves, and is more
pertinent to the issue before us. The intricate network of laws governing the
status of Indian tribes and their members, growing out of a collision between
two civilizations and resting on a unique mixture of old treaties, military
engagements, a concept of the white man's burden, and guilty consciences, car-
ries for me no implications whatsoever for other groups in our society, except
to warn us that the role of the Great White Father may be bitterly resented
by those in his tutelage and that a guardian ordinarily prefers to postpone
rather than to advance the day when his wards must face the rigors of free-
dom. I agree that the Supreme Court, in permitting Negroes to attack the
systematic exclusion of other Negroes from state juries, seems to have ac-
cepted a vague notion of racial solidarity between the Negro defendant and the
excluded Negroes, but these cases may also rest on the unstated theory that a
community which systematically excludes Negroes from jury service may by
the same token lean toward unfairness--on the whole and without regard to
individual cases-in its treatment of Negro defendants in criminal cases. More-
over, the hints of racial solidarity in these cases are countered by the Supreme
Court's rejection on other occasions of proportional representation as a basis
25. Of course, in extirpating official acts of discrimination, it may be necessary to make
a factual inquiry into a person's race: e.g., if systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury
service is alleged, the complaint cannot be disposed of without a determination of the facts,
including the race of persons admitted to and excluded from jury duty. See also Meredith
v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962), holding that a state university's requirement that a can-
didate for admission furnish certificates from alumni (all of whom were, by reason of official
segregation in the past, White) was unconstitutional as applied to Negro applicants.
I would also exclude those areas in which the official determination is evoked by some
private behavior (e.g., a bequest to aid Negro education) and is not forbidden by the rule
in Shelley v. Kraemer; in these instances, the racial classification may be tolerated as we
tolerate religious classifications for identical or comparable purposes. See Clark, Charitable
Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YAL LJ. 979
(1957); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. Rnv.
473 (1962) ; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 1083 (1960). In
determining when Shelley forbids and when it permits judicial enforcement of discrimina-
tory conduct, however, I can conceive of a distinction between private conduct that can be
made effective with only occasional judicial intervention (e.g., a bequest to A provided he
marries a person of the same race; a gift to charity on condition it be used primarily for
Negroes) and conduct that may require constant judicial oversight or frequent decisions
on disputed racial classifications in borderline cases (e.g., a charity to aid exclusively per-
sons of more than 80% Negro blood, the corpus to revert if any benefits are given to an
unqualified person).
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for state jury service,2 6 as well as by the fact that the mere absence of Negroes
from juries, other than as a result of deliberate and systematic exclusion,
does not violate a Negro defendant's rights under the equal protection or
due process clauses. If the foundation of such cases as Strauder v. West
Virginia were that juries manned by members of one race cannot dispense
even-handed justice to members of the other race, a plan for proportional
racial representation would seem not merely tolerable, but essential. Finally,
one cannot possibly build a jurisprudence of race relations on the Supreme
Court's unsystematic references to the race or color of persons convicted of
crime in cases assessing the due process implications of a delay in arraignment,
an allegedly involuntary confession, or the lack of counsel. Judge Everett
finds in these references a rule of "benevolent vigilance" over Negroes ac-
cused of crime; even if this much can be extracted from the cases, which I
doubt, it surely does not lead to the conclusion that legislatures may exer-
cise in other areas of life whatever benevolent supervision they may believe
is required by the social problems they perceive.
In concluding, I cannot forbear to suggest that this is another area in which
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson will be vindicated:
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of
the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know
the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights.
[163 U.S. at 554.] There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil
rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of
the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of
his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved. [163 U.S. at 559.]
I cherish the faith that this uncompromising insistence on equality will do
more to turn hope into reality than the flexible philosophy of the New Har-
mony ordinance, resourceful and appealing as it may seem; but whether this
be so or not, Justice Harlan's words are for me the authentic voice of the
fourteenth amendment.
I concur, therefore, in the court's affirmance of the judgment below.
26. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-42 (1879); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398
(1945).
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